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I. PREFACE
T HE higher the tax rates, the stronger the incentive to exploit
terms of the taxing statute as a means of avoiding the high rates.
The collapsible corporation, a device for converting ordinary income
into capital gains, became common because of the high tax rates im-
posed during World War II. Initially, it was most commonly used in
the motion-picture industry, but it was soon found useful in other
fields, such as the construction industry.
In the typical case, a person who anticipated earning a large amount
of income through the manufacture, production, or purchase of prop-
erty, organized a corporation and caused it to carry on the activity.
After the expiration of more than six months and before the corpora-
tion realized the ordinary income which was the fruit of its efforts,
the stockholder either sold his stock or liquidated his corporation. He
thus obtained as a long-term capital gain what would otherwise have
been taxed as ordinary income.
To close this loophole, the "collapsible corporation" provisions
were enacted into the federal tax laws in 1950.' Probably the only
provisions of the code more complex than the original collapsible sec-
tion are the amendments to that section. The newest addition, sub-
section (f) enacted in 1964, is certainly consistent with this propo-
sition.
The purpose of this Article is to present a comprehensive examina-
tion of the collapsible rules. A secondary purpose involves (to use
1 Section 117 (m), the original collapsible corporation provision, was added to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939 by the Revenue Act of 1950. The section was amended by the Reve-
nue Act of 1951.
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the words of the statute) a "view to" planning one's way around,
through, or out of the hazardous area created by section 341.2
II. TREATMENT OF COLLAPSIBLE STOCK
The Internal Revenue Code imposes ordinary income treatment for
the following transactions involving "collapsible corporations:"'
(1) the sale or exchange of its stock;4 (2) a distribution in partial
or complete liquidation;' or (3) a distribution, gain from which would
otherwise be treated as gain from the sale or exchange of its stock."
If the shareholder has held his stock six months or less, the gain is
treated as a short term capital gain.' If the stock has been held for
more than six months, the gain is treated as though arising from the
sale of property which is not a capital asset.'
III. DEFINITION OF "COLLAPSIBLE
CORPORATION"
The code defines a "collapsible corporation" as one which is formed
or availed of principally for the manufacture, construction, or pro-
duction of property, for the purchase of "section 341 assets," or for
the holding of stock in a corporation so formed or availed of, with a
view to the following objectives:
(1) The sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders [whether in liqui-
dation or otherwise], or a distribution to its shareholders, before
[the corporation realizes] . . . a "substantial part" of the taxable
income to be derived from such property,' and
(2) The realization by such shareholders of gain attributable to such
property.e
Two aspects of this definition are particularly interesting. The
first is the subjective feature; the often-litigated and usually-perplex-
'The original § 117(m) was re-enacted without substantial change as § 341 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and was amended by the Technical Amendments Act of
1958, by the Revenue Act of 1962, and by Pub. L. Mo. 88-484.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341.4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (a) (1). See Elliott v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 384
(D. Ore. 1962) (transfer between promoters, per prearranged plan not a "sale").
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (a) (2). Whether any stock was surrendered is im-
material. Jesse Hartman, 34 T.C. 1085 (1960).
SINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 341 (a) (3), 301 (c) (3) (A). And see Arthur Pomponio,
33 T.C. 1072 (1960) (decided under the 1939 Code).7
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1221, 1222(1).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(a).
0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b)(1)(A).
0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (b) (1) (B).
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ing test of intent1 forms the basis of the section's application. The
second is the use of words that are pregnant with litigation potential.
A. "Formed Or Availed Of"
A corporation must be "formed or availed of" for one of the pur-
poses previously mentioned before the collapsible rules can apply.
Even if the corporation is "formed" for one of the proscribed pur-
poses, however, if the event whereby the corporation is "availed of"
fails to occur, the ordinary-income results should likewise not occur.
For example, two individuals form a corporation to manufacture
certain items, with intent to liquidate the corporation before it re-
alizes a substantial part of the income from the sale of the manu-
factured property. The stockholders subsequently change their intent,
however, and they retain their stock until after the corporation re-
alizes a substantial part of the income from the manufactured items.
Thereafter, they liquidate the corporation. If the disjunctive "or" is
taken literally, the corporation, having been "formed" for the pro-
scribed purpose, remains collapsible even though never having been
"availed of" for that purpose. This strict interpretation imposes a re-
sult which is harsher than the purpose of the statute requires. It has
even been rejected by the Internal Revenue Service." The key event,
therefore, apparently is not the "formation" of the corporation but,
instead, the "availing of" the corporation.
B. "Principally"
To which words in the statutory definition of a collapsible corpora-
tion is the word "principally" meant to apply? A reasonable argu-
ment could be made that "principally" applies only to the phrase
"with a view to." Drawing, by analogy, from the interpretation of
similar language elsewhere in the code, 3 one could then argue that
more than fifty per cent of the intent in "forming" or "availing of"
the corporation would have to be the "view to" collapsing it.
The Internal Revenue Service, as might be expected, takes a dif-
ferent position. The service interprets "principally" as measuring not
" Although the matter of intent is a question of the subjective state of a person's mind,
the court6 have relied on objective facts to determine this intent. Thus, for example, in
Jack D. Saltzman, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 336 (1963), the court said: "If petitioner's con-
clusion as to his intent were required to be accepted in accordance with his statement, dis-
position of the question here involved could be made on the basis of this testimony of peti-
tioner. However, the requisite view is a subjective state of mind which must be determined
through assessing the objective facts." See also Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5(b) (1955).
12Rev. Rul. 58-241. 1958-1 CUM. BULL. 179.
saE.g., TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 269 ("principal purpose"); TNT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1231(b) ("primarily"). Cf. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966) ("primarily"),
on remand, 18 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5015 (S.D. Cal. May 6, 1966).
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the intended action by the shareholders but, instead, the listed activ-
ities of the corporation, i.e., (1) the manufacture, construction, or
production of property; (2) the purchase of "section 341 assets"; or
(3) the holding of stock in a corporation so formed or availed of.
The difference between the two positions on what "principally"
refers to is very important. The Commissioner can usually prove with
relative ease that the principal intention in the use of the corporation
was, for example, manufacturing. His job is made much harder if
he must prove that the principal intent was to collapse the corpora-
tion. To date, the Commissioner has been uniformly successful in his
interpretation found in the regulations.'4
C. "Manufacture, Construction, Or Production"
For purposes of the statutory definition, a corporation is regarded
as having manufactured, constructed, or produced property if it en-
gages in any of these activities "to any extent."'" The corporation is
also regarded as having manufactured, constructed, produced, or pur-
chased property if it receives such property and takes the transferor's
basis therein in a nontaxable exchange,"6 or if it receives property in
a nontaxable exchange in substitution for property which the cor-
poration manufactured, constructed, produced, or purchased."
Since many of the cases have involved real estate corporations, the
courts have had to consider what "construction" is in that context.
The revenue service has taken the seemingly extreme position that
merely rezoning for a shopping center constitutes construction.' If
additional steps are taken, the Tax Court will apparently find that
construction has taken place. Thus, for example, in J. D. Abbott"
the Tax Court held that the arrangement for F.H.A. financing, the
obtaining of the approval of the plan by the township, and the
agreement to construct streets and sewers were "construction" for
this purpose. The court pointed to the words "to any extent"' in the
14 E.g., Farber v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1963); Mintz v. Commissioner,
284 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1960), affirming 32 T.C. 723 (1959); Weil v. Commissioner, 252
F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1958), affirming 28 T.C. 809 (1957); Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d
765 (4th Cir. 1958); R.A. Bryan, 32 T.C. 104 (1959), acq., 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 4, aff'd
in Part and remanded on another issue, 281 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
931 (1961).
15 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (b) (2) (A).
'
6
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (b) (2) (B).
1INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (b) (2) (C).
18 Rev. Rul. 56-137, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 178.
"J. D. Abbott, 28 T.C. 795 (1957), aff'd, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958). See also Sproul
Realty Co., 38 T.C. 844 (1962), acq. 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 4; Jack Farber, 36 T.C. 1142
(1961), aff'd, 312 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1963); Ellisworth J. Sterner, 32 T.C. 1144 (1959);
Leland D. Payne, 30 T.C. 1044 (1958), aff'd, 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959).
'0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (b) (2) (A).
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statute as the justification for the broad interpretation of "construc-
tion." The Second Circuit,"' by way of dictum, has said:
We are not obliged to rely wholly on the filing of applications for
permits and loans guarantees and the payment of required filing fees,
although we do not say that, in this age when real estate development
is so dependent upon governmental licenses and financial aid, the filing
of papers to procure these could not, as much as the digging of a cellar
excavation, constitute "construction ... to any extent.",
2
2
The Tax Court has held, however, that the mere filing of a tenta-
tive plat was not "construction."'
The scope of application of the terms "manufacture, construction,
or production" has yet to be satisfactorily defined by the courts. The
problem is most acute in such areas as the natural resources indus-
tries. The revenue service has ruled," for example, that section 341
applies to a corporation which has acquired wildcat oil leases. The
corporation in question had completed producing wells on the prop-
erties, and the value of the leases was thereby substantially increased.
The stockholders capitalized on their good fortune by selling their
stock at a price which reflected the augmented value. The revenue
service found that the collapsible definition did apply, that is, that the
corporation was engaged in the "construction or production" of prop-
erty.
On the other hand, another revenue ruling" indicates that unsuc-
cessful exploratory activity on an oil and gas lease does not consti-
tute "construction or production." The latter ruling is helpful in
applying a specific limitation to section 341 . As for the general defi-
nition of a collapsible corporation, however, the ruling would appear
to help only those who would use the corporate vehicle for the drill-
ing of dry holes.
A federal district court' has said that a reasonable interpretation
of the phrase "construction or production" would include the activi-
ties of obtaining leases, drilling wells on them, and equipping the
productive wells. However, this was merely dictum since the court
determined that the requisite "view" to a sale was absent.
The plight of the natural resources industries under the statute was
the subject of comment in the committee reports on the Technical
"Farber v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1963).
1 id. at 734.
"Vernon W. McPherson, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 583 (1962). See also Morris Cohen,
39 T.C. 886 (1963) (efforts to rezone and to assure availability of water and sewer service).24 Rev. Rul. 57-346, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 236.
25Rev. Rul. 64-125, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 131.
20 See notes 145-51 infra and accompanying text.
1
7 Honaker Drilling, Inc. v. Koehler, 190 F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1960).
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Amendments Act of 1958.28 There it was noted that in the case of a
corporation with continuing development activity, there can be no
certainty as to its collapsibility. This is so even though the corpora-
tion has little or no inventories and even though gain on the sale of the
property would be capital gain if sold by the shareholders. The im-
portance of the nature of the gain when imputed to the stockholders
will be discussed later in this Article.
D. "Section 341 Assets"
Another proscribed corporate activity is the purchase of property
which the code calls "section 341 assets." 9 Included in this term are
assets held for less than three years which are:
(1) Inventory items;"
(2) Property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of the purchasing corporation's business;"
(3) Property used in the purchasing corporation's business (section
1231(b) property), except for property which is used to produce
property described in (1) and (2) above; 2 or
(4) Unrealized receivable or fees for services or for sales of property
described in (1), (2), or (3) above."
In determining the three-year holding period of section 341 as-
sets, there is taken into account the "tacked-on" holding period which
usually results from nontaxable exchanges." In any event, however,
the holding period does not begin to run until the completion of the
manufacture, construction, production, or purchase."
The revenue service' has taken the reasonable position that where
a corporation is liquidated for bona fide business reasons, it is not col-
lapsible under the given facts even though the corporation has not
yet realized the income attributable to inventory appreciation. Im-
portant in the situation ruled upon was the fact that the inventory of
the corporation at the time of liquidation was normal for the volume
of sales and was no more than the average inventory over the past
several years. This type of comparison with prior business history is
also adopted in the regulations."'
28S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), 1958-3 CUM. BULL. 922, 953.
2
'
9 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b)(1), (3).
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (b) (3) (A). See also notes 36-37 infra and accom-
panying text.
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (b) (3) (B). See, e.g., Southwest Properties, Inc., 38
T.C. 97 (1962).
5 2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b) (3) (D).
3INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b)(3)(C).
14 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (b) (3); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1223.
"
5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b) (3).
3 Rev. Rul. 56-244, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 176.37 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5(c)(1) (1955).
[Vol. 20:748
COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATIONS
An Alabama federal district court in Levenson v. United States8
took a refreshing approach to the question of when a corporation is
collapsible because of its inventory. There the corporation was formed
to receive a partnership's contract to purchase house trailers. Within
a year the stock of the corporation was sold. Although the court rec-
ognized that there was a tax avoidance motive, the court still held
that the corporation was not collapsible. The only "section 341 assets"
were a contract to purchase trailers and an inventory of trailers. The
court noted that 1,795 trailers had been sold by the partnership and
that 109 trailers remained on hand. Using those figures, the court
concluded that the seventy per cent exception (to be discussed later)
applied. The trailers to be purchased under the contract were not
taken into account as "inventory" in the computation.
E. Holding Stock
The remaining collapsible corporate activity is the holding of stock
in a corporation which is formed or availed of for one of the activities
previously described. 9 In order for the holding company to be re-
garded as a collapsible corporation, the activity of holding the stock
must be a substantial one in relation to other activities.'
In 1956 the revenue service issued a ruling"' dealing with a corpo-
ration which was collapsible because of holding stock. The parent
corporation had sold its interest in the subsidiary and had then dis-
tributed all of the parent's assets in liquidation. The ruling held that
the parent corporation incurred ordinary income on the sale of the
collapsible subsidiary's stock, but that the subsequent liquidation of
the parent resulted in capital gain, not ordinary income, to the par-
ent's shareholders. The statute refers only to the realization of taxable
income by the corporation producing the property and not to any
realization by the corporation holding its stock. The ruling noted that
a literal reading of the statute would cause the holding company still
to be collapsible even though it already had been taxed as the share-
holder of a collapsible corporation. The ruling states, however, that
the suggested interpretation would be contrary to congressional in-
tent; therefore, the shareholders are entitled to treat as capital gain
the gain on the second liquidation.
F. Presumption Of Collapsibility
A presumption arises that a corporation is collapsible if the fair
38 157 F. Supp. 244 (D. Ala. 1957).
39 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (b) (1).
40Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5(b) (1955).
41 Rev. Rul. 56-50, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 174.
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market value of its section 341 assets is (1) fifty per cent or more of
the fair market value of its total assets, and (2) 120 per cent or more
of the adjusted basis of the section 341 assets.42 Total assets, for this
purpose, do not include cash, obligations which are capital assets,
governmental obligations, or stock in other corporations."' This pre-
sumption works only against the corporation. Thus, the failure of a
corporation to come within the requirements of the presumption does
not in turn give rise to a contrary presumption that the corporation
is not collapsible."
G. "View"
The requisite intent of the stockholders to collapse the corpora-
tion is described by the statute in terms of a "view."' The regulations
adopt a very broad interpretation of this requirement:
[It] is satisfied in any case in which such action was contemplated by
those persons in a position to determine the policies of the corporation
whether by reason of their owning a majority of the voting stock or
otherwise. The requirement is satisfied whether such action was con-
templated, unconditionally, conditionally, or as a recognized possibility.
If the corporation was so formed or availed of, it is immaterial [that]
... a shareholder at such time, did not share in such view. Any gain of
such shareholder on his stock shall be treated in the same manner as
gain of a shareholder who did share in such view. The existence of a
bona fide business reason for doing business in the corporate form does
not, by itself, negate the fact that the corporation may also have been
formed or availed of with a view to the action described.'
Moreover, several courts'7 have inferred the requisite view from
objective facts," without proof of even the "recognized possibility""
or reasonable foreseeability ° required by the regulations. It could be
argued that this is the "best evidence"'" of the necessary subjective
intent.
1. Intent of Minority Shareholders The minority shareholder who
finds himself owning stock in a collapsible corporation is, to a con-
' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (c) (1). For example of case in which presumption
was rebutted, see Jack D. Saltzman, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 336 (1963). But cf. Max N.
Tobias, 40 T.C. 84 (1963).43 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341(c)(2).
4INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (c) (1). But see Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5(c) (1955).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (b) (1).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a)(2) (1955). (Emphasis added.)
4 Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958); Burge v. Commissioner,
253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958).
"See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5(b) (1955).
49Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2 (a) (2) (1955).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5(a)(3) (1955).
" Payne v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959).
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siderable extent, dependent upon the majority for a determination of
his tax status. The regulations quoted above recognize this. 2
In Sylvester J. Lowery,"' an important case decided by the Tax
Court, the taxpayer was a minority stockholder in four corporations
two of which were found to be collapsible and two of which were
not. As to the two corporations which were collapsible, the Tax Court
said: "[T]here was a sale of all of the stock by all of the shareholders
and it is clear that petitioner, in fact, shared in the view of the ma-
jority of the shareholders to sell the stock prior to the realization by
the corporations of any part of the net income to be derived from theproperty.""
A different conclusion was reached with respect to the other two
corporations. There the selling shareholder was not within section 341
since the majority did not have the proscribed "view." After one of
those corporations had completed fifty per cent of the construction
on a building, a Mr. Frankel, who was in control of the operation,
determined that additional investment would be required on the part
of the stockholders. The taxpayer was unable to raise additional funds.
Frankel thereupon advised the taxpayer that two new investors were
willing to advance a portion of the needed funds, but only on the
condition that they obtained an equity interest in the corporation. The
taxpayer thereupon sold his stock. The court said that:
in many respects the transactions which took place with respect to
Parkway and Raleigh are similar to those which occurred with respect
to Carver and Duval. One material distinction exists, however. In both
Parkway and Raleigh, those owning the majority of the stock and who
were not only in a position to, but did, in fact, control their policies,
did not sell their stock but continued to operate the corporations.
Neither corporation was availed of "with a view to" the action described
in section 117(m) (2) (A), by those owning a majority of the stock
and controlling its policies. It necessarily follows that petitioner did not
"share" in such a view. Neither corporation was "collapsible" or was
ever in fact collapsed....
In our opinion section 117(m) was not intended to apply where, as
here, a minority shareholder is compelled, because of circumstances over
which he had no control, to dispose of his investment in a corporation
which is thereafter continued in operation by the majority shareholders."
A strong dissenting opinion stated that since the sale of stock is an
"2 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (2) (1955).
3 39 T.C. 959 (1963), aff'd, 335 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1964); accord, Ralph J. Solow,
22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 398 (1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1964); Goodwin v. United
States, 320 F.2d 356 (Ct. CI. 1963).
" Sylvester J. Lowery, 39 T.C. 959, 967 (1963). (Emphasis in original.) See also Max
N. Tobias, 40 T.C. 84 (1963).5539 T.C. 959, 970.
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individual matter, the "view" of other shareholders can have only
evidentiary bearing on what was in the taxpayer's mind.5
The Court of Claims has followed the Tax Court's position on the
minority stockholder issue in a case involving a twenty-five per cent
minority stockholder.' Numerous discussions and disagreements be-
tween the majority stockholders and the twenty-five per cent stock-
holder resulted in a decision to dissolve their business relationship.
The minority stockholder's interest was, therefore, redeemed at a
time when the corporation held excess mortgage proceeds on a con-
struction loan. Despite the fact that the minority stockholder had
apparently been active in the policy decisions of the corporation, the
Court of Claims followed the Tax Court rule: "The essence of the
Tax Court's rulings is that the collapsible corporation provisions are
not applicable in a case in which a minority stockholder has his stock
redeemed and the majority stockholder continues to own the corpora-
tion .... [W]e agree with the Tax Court's rulings."'"
This interpretation presents a useful planning device if it means
that a minority stockholder, regardless of his "view" respecting the
corporation, can bail out without collapsing the corporation, as long
as the majority intend to continue operations.
2. Timing the View Among the other unanswered issues posed by
the statute is when the view"' must exist. The regulations give this
answer:
A corporation is formed or availed of with a view to the action described
in section 341 (b) if the requisite view existed at any time during the
manufacture, production, construction, or purchase referred to in that
section. Thus, if the sale, exchange, or distribution is attributable solely
to circumstances which arose after the manufacture, construction, pro-
duction or purchase (other than circumstances which reasonably could
be anticipated at the time of such manufacture, construction, produc-
tion, or purchase), the corporation shall, in the absence of compelling
facts to the contrary, be considered not to have been so formed or
availed of. However, if the sale, exchange or distribution is attributable
to circumstances present at the time of the manufacture, construction,
production, or purchase, the corporation shall, in the absence of com-
pelling facts to the contrary, be considered to have been so formed or
availed of."
The position taken by the regulations, that the view must exist
5' 39 T.C. 959, 971. This suggestion probably obtains a fairer result, by not imposing
the tainted majority "view" on a minority shareholder. Such a rule would prevent many
of the anomalies which result under the present statute.
" Goodwin v. United States, 320 F.2d 356 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
'lid. at 359.
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b)(1).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a)(3) (1955).
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prior to completion of the manufacture, production, construction, or
purchase, appears reasonable in light of the intent of the statute. It is
clear-and the courts have so held 0-that the view need not exist at
the time the corporation is formed.
On the other hand, the regulations have been regarded by some
courts, particularly the Second and Fourth Circuits," as being too
narrow. The argument is that the view is sufficient if it exists when
the corporation is availed of, regardless of whether the view was pres-
ent before completion of the manufacture, production, construction,
or purchase. For example, if a corporation is used principally for the
manufacture of property and it is not until after the completion of
the manufacturing that the stockholders decide to "avail" themselves
of the corporation-liquidate or sell in order to recognize the appre-
ciation in the property by way of capital gain-then the corporation
will still be collapsible.
The Fifth Circuit, 3 while not expressly disagreeing with the posi-
tion that the regulations are too narrow, has pointed out by way of
dictum that this seems to overlook the statute's requirement that the
corporation must be availed of for construction of property with a
view to distribution, etc. According to this court, a respectable argu-
ment can be made that unless the "'view" is present before or during
construction the statute is not satisfied.
Other courts have gone farther than the Fifth Circuit and have
expressly rejected the Second and Fourth Circuits' interpretation. The
Third Circuit" has held that the "view" must exist before the con-
struction of the property was completed. Thus, where the intention
to sell arose after completion of construction of a building and was
occasioned by cracks discovered in the building, it was held that the
"view" originated too late for the corporation to be collapsible.
In what might be labeled the "handy heart attack" line of cases,
the Tax Court and other courts have tended to favor the taxpayer
whose health has turned bad. In Maxwell Temkin"' the Tax Court
held that a corporation was not collapsible where the sale was promp-
ted by a stockholder having a "typical attack of angina." The Com-
missioner argued that since the taxpayer had previously had heart
" E.g., Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cit. 1958).
"'Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958); Burge v. Commissioner,
253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958). See also Farber v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.
1963); Sidney v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cif. 1960); cf. Commissioner v.
Solow, 333 F.2d 76 (2d Cit. 1964).
"5Payne v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959).
'Jacobson v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1960).
6535 T.C. 906 (1961). See also Elliott v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 384 (D. Ore.
1962); cf. Sproul Realty Co., 38 T.C. 844 (1962), acq., 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 4.
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trouble, the angina attack was a circumstance which "reasonably could
be anticipated."" The Tax Court, however, found that during con-
struction the taxpayer did not in fact anticipate another heart attack.
Certainly respondent does not wish to have his regulation so construed
as to render it statutorily impossible for anyone who has suffered a heart
attack to invest in the construction or production of income-producing
property without assuming the certainty that should he suffer another
attack which itself occasions the sale of his stock his gains are to be
treated as ordinary income and so taxed. It is reasonable to anticipate
that it is statistically possible or even probable that events will occur
in the ordinary business of life which might require one who has in-
vested in property of the type referred to in section 117(m) to sell the
property, but so to construe the regulation that such possibilities pre-
clude capital gains treatment of such sales would render the regulation
in that respect invalid as not within the framework of section 117 (m)YG6
In Charles J. Riley,8 a variation of the same theme, the taxpayer
was advised by his doctor to change from the business of owning and
managing apartments to something requiring more physical activity.
The Tax Court concluded that the sale was attributable solely to cir-
cumstances which arose at a time substantially after the completion
of construction of the corporation's apartment building. The court
also found that the reason for the sale could not have been reason-
ably anticipated at the time of construction. Therefore, the proscribed
tview" was absent. Also, the Tax Court has held for the taxpayer
where it found that his discovery that others were misappropriating
funds could not have been anticipated during construction."
A district court in New Jersey went further and held that a sale
occasioned by a heart attack during construction did not bring on
collapsible results." The court said that:
[T]he only reasonable inference that may be drawn from the affirma-
tive proofs is that the two corporations were not formed or availed of
with a view, on the part of either [stockholder] . . . , to the sale of the
corporate stock before realization of substantial taxable income to be
derived from the property. There is no evidence that such action on the
part of either was contemplated "unconditionally, conditionally, or as
a recognized possibility." A long-term investment in income-producing
property was the objective. The achievement thereof on the part of
Shilowitz was frustrated by his heart attack, and his withdrawal from
"0Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (3) (1955), quoted at note 49 supra. See also the leading
case of August v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 829, 833-34 (3d Cir. 1959) and Carl B. Rechner,
30 T.C. 186, 194 (1958).
6735 T.C. 906, 912 (1961).
"8Charles J. Riley, 35 T.C. 848 (1961). See also Southwest Properties, Inc., 38 T.C. 97
(1962).
" Ralph J. Solow, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 398 (1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1964).
7°Shilowitz v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 179 (D.N.J. 1963).
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the joint venture by sale of his stock was an involuntary consequence
of unforeseen circumstances over which he had no control. The fact
that he did dispose of his stock at a gain, under the compulsion of such
circumstances, is not inconsistent, as defendant urges, with the absence
of the prescribed statutory view.
The test is whether unforeseen circumstances which could not have
been reasonably anticipated were the sole producing cause of change
of plan.7
This holding is surprisingly liberal in view of the Supreme Court's
somewhat mechanical application of the statute in Braunstein v. Com-
missioner which will be discussed later."
Along a similar vein, the revenue service has ruled7 that a corpora-
tion was not collapsible where it liquidated74 because of the enact-
ment of certain legislation. The ruling emphasized that during con-
struction there had been no basis for reasonable anticipation that the
legislation would be enacted."
The rule set forth in the regulations appears to be a reasonable in-
terpretation of the law. If "manufacture," etc. is to be the point in
time when the collapsible intent must occur, then certainly it is
appropriate to inquire whether during the manufacture events were
reasonably foreseeable which would lead to collapsing the corpora-
tion.7"
The important question of when the manufacture is regarded as
completed will be taken up in more detail with the discussion of the
three-year limitation."
3. The Ivey-Braunstein Dichotomy An interesting line of cases
found two circuits to be in complete disagreement over the scope of
the statute's application. The issue was finally resolved by the Supreme
Court in Braunstein v. Commissioner,"5 which was limited to a con-
" Id. at 184. See also Commissioner v. Lowery, 335 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1964); Commis-
sioner v. Solow, 333 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1964).
72 374 U.S. 65 (1963). See discussion accompanying and following note 78 infra.
7aRev.. Rul. 75-575, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 236. Compare R. A. Bryan, 32 T.C. 104
(1959), acq., 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 4, aff~d and 'remanded on another issue, 281 F.2d 238
(4th Cir. 1960).
" The ruling actually dealt with the applicability of § 337 to the sale of the corporate
assets. As discussed later, § 337 is generally inapplicable where the corporation is collapsible.
72In Tibbals v. United States, 17 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1213, 1221 (Ct. Cl. June 10,
1966) is the following comment: "Despite some early indications to the contrary by the
. . . Second and Fourth Circuits, it now appears to be settled that the view to sale . . .
must have existed before completion of the construction work for which the corporation
was formed." See also Coates v. United States, 6 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5200 (D. Ore. 1960).
70 See, e.g., Mintz v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1960), affirming 32 T.C. 723
(1959).
" See text accompanying notes 147-51 infra.
78Braunstein v. Commissioner, 374 U.S. 65 (1963), affirming 305 F.2d 949 (2d Cir.
1962). The discussion in this part borrows heavily from Malouf, Braunstein Affirmed: 341
Applies Despite Shareholder's Capital Gain Status, 19 J. TAXATION 80 (1963).
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sideration of the following issue: "Whether Section 117(m) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 [Section 341 of the 1954 Code] ...
is inapplicable in circumstances where the stockholders would have
been entitled to capital gains treatment had they conducted the enter-
prise in their individual capacities without using a corporation.""9
The Supreme Court held that the imputed capital-gain status of the
stockholders is irrelevant in determining whether the collapsible pro-
visions can apply. In order to appreciate the significance of the Su-
preme Court's decision, one should be familiar with the case develop-
ment which preceded the decision.
In Honaker Drilling, Inc. v. United States," a district court case,
a man and his wife were partners in an oil and gas operation. The
business was transferred to a corporation after the husband was told
that he had cancer, and his business advisers recommended the cor-
porate form for continuing the business. The corporation (taxpayer)
proceeded to carry on the business, drilling primarily on properties in
which it owned an interest. After a year the taxpayer received, un-
solicited, an especially favorable offer for the sale of its properties.
The properties were sold, and the corporation distributed its assets
within twelve months.
The Commissioner contended that the corporation was collapsible
and that the nonrecognition provisions of section 337, dealing with
certain liquidations, were therefore inapplicable.81 This would have
caused the corporation to recognize the gain on the sale of its assets.
The court, however, found against the Commissioner. The practice
legislated against, according to the court, was the attempt to convert
income taxable at ordinary rates into income taxable at capital gain
rates. In support of this interpretation, the court quoted the follow-
ing excerpt from the Senate Finance Committee report on the Revenue
Act of 1950: "The collapsible corporation is a device whereby one
or more individuals attempt to convert the profits from their partici-
pation in a project from income taxable at ordinary rates to long-term
capital gain taxable only at a rate of 25 per cent.""
The court concluded that a reasonable interpretation of "construc-
tion or production" would include the activities of obtaining leases,
drilling wells on them, and equipping the productive wells. It found,
however, that the corporation was organized solely because of the
impairment of the principal stockholder's health and that the stock-
7
9 Id. at 68.
go 190 F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1960).
81 See text accompanying note 184 infra.
82S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1950).
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holders had no intention of selling until the prospect of making an
attractive profit presented itself.
Apparently persuaded by the committee reports that the absence
of intent to convert ordinary income into capital gains precludes, at
least in part, the "view" required by the statute, the court concluded
that there was no intent to liquidate the corporation before a sub-
stantial part of the taxable income from the leases had been realized. s3
In October 1961, the Fifth Circuit rendered an opinion which
represents a landmark in judicial attempts to avoid the harsh results
of a statute's arbitrary application. United States v. Ivey" involved
the sale of stock of a corporation formed to construct an apartment
building. During construction it became apparent that the building
would be completely rented. When the building was seventy-five per
cent completed, the taxpayer sold his stock at a substantial gain.
In asserting that his gain was capital, the taxpayer argued that the
collapsible section is inapplicable when the stockholder would be en-
titled to a capital gain on a sale of the assets without benefit of in-
corporation. The court generally accepted the taxpayer's position,
setting forth two alternative approaches: (1) as a matter of statutory
interpretation, section 341 is inapplicable to taxpayers who would
have been entitled to capital gains treatment without incorporating;
or (2) the fact that the taxpayer has no need for the corporate device
simply bears on the question of "view" or "intent." The court took
the first approach "because it seems closer to the underlying con-
gressional purposes"" and held "that Section 341 does not penalize
the taxpayer by converting his capital gain into ordinary income.""
The court admitted that the statutory language is clear but said
that the legislative history of section 117 (m) of the 1939 Code shows
"beyond dispute" that the proscribed mischief was the abuse of the
corporate device as a technique for transmuting ordinary income into
capital gain. Only by reading this purpose into the words of the law
could the law have plain meaning."
It is interesting to note that the Fifth Circuit pointed to the
Honaker case as the only decision which had faced the issue squarely.
Honaker, however, may be read as taking the second alternative ap-
83 190 F. Supp. at 295. "I find that Honaker Drlg., Inc., was not formed or availed of
with a view to the accomplishment of the purposes set out in § 341(b) (1) (A) and (B),
and hence that it was not a collapsible corporation within the meaning of that section."
'4294 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1961).
83 Id. at 802.
Ibid.
87 It is interesting to note that the court apportioned the capital gain between short and
long term because some construction occurred within six months of the stock sale. This
treatment has possibilities as an alternative to the present statute.
1966]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
proach discussed by the Fifth Circuit in Ivey, i.e., that the taxpayer's
having no need for the corporate device simply bears on the question
of "view" or "intent.""
The Fifth Circuit subsequently denied rehearing in Ivey but took
the opportunity to clarify its original opinion by stating that: "The
statute's purpose is to treat the taxpayer's gain as though it had been
received directly by the individual."8
Unfortunately, however, the Fifth Circuit's approach was to be
short lived. Two months after the second Ivey opinion the Second
Circuit handed down its decision in Braunstein.!' That case involved
the taxation of a stockholder on distributions from and sale of stock
of two apartment corporations. The taxpayer failed to convince either
the Tax Court or the Second Circuit that the corporations did not
fit into the collapsible section. The taxpayer argued before the court
of appeals that the collapsible provisions should not apply if the con-
structed apartment buildings would have produced capital gain on
a sale by the taxpayer individually. The Second Circuit flatly rejected
this argument, recognizing, however, that the argument had been
recently accepted by the Fifth Circuit in the Ivey decision. The
court reasoned as follows:
(a) Although a literal reading of the statute may occasionally
produce unwarranted taxation of capital gain as ordinary
income, for the courts to rewrite this complex legislation
would produce even more confusion."'
(b) Ivey violates one of the clear policy decisions embodied in
the collapsible provisions, the all-or-nothing approach to
long-term capital gains.
(c) The enactment in 1958 of subsection (e) 9 of section 341
was designed to narrow the imposition of ordinary income
treatment in the Ivey-type situation. Ivey, however, went
even further than subsection (e). Therefore, if Ivey is cor-
rect, either subsection (e) is unnecessary or, if it is regarded
as overriding the reasoning in Ivey, subsection (e) expands
rather than contracts the application of the collapsible pro-
visions; this is clearly contrary to what Congress intended.
" See text following note 93 infra.
88303 F.2d 109, 110 (Sth Cir. 1962). (Emphasis in original.)
9 Braunstein v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 374 U.S. 65 (1963);
accord, Sproul Realty Co., 38 T.C. 844 (1962), acq. 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 4; Max N. Tobias,
40 T.C. 84 (1963).
'1 For an example of a ruling in whch the Internal Revenue Service recognizes the harsh
results that a literal reading of § 341 can produce, see Rev. Rul. 56-50, 1956-1 CUM. BULL.
174.
" See text accompanying notes 152-96 infra.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Braunstein on the basis
of the conflict with Ivey. The taxpayer argued that the phrase "gain
attributable to such property" must apply only to profit that would
have constituted ordinary income if a corporation had not been uti-
lized. The Court found nothing in the language or structure of the
section to demand, or even justify, reading into the statute the addi-
tional requirement that the taxpayer must in fact have been using
the corporate form as a device to convert ordinary income into capital
gain. And even though the legislative history clearly shows that the
purpose of Congress was to close a loophole, the method chosen to
close this loophole was to establish a carefully and elaborately defined
category of transactions in which income that might otherwise be a
capital gain would have to be treated as ordinary income.
As reinforcement for this conclusion, the Court noted the "practi-
cal difficulties-indeed the impossibilities-of considering without
more legislative guidance than is furnished by Section 117(m)
whether there has in fact been 'conversion' of ordinary income into
capital gains in a particular case."93
The Supreme Court's decision in Braunstein came as a disappoint-
ment but not as a surprise. The demise of Ivey, however, may not
mean the end of all hope in this area; the Honaker decision may still
be helpful.
The Honaker decision lacked much in the way of clarity. The fact
that a sale of the assets by the shareholders would have resulted in
capital gain was certainly persuasive to the court. It is difficult to
determine, however, on what basis the court was persuaded. Did it
accept the Ivey theory (first alternative) that as a matter of statutory
interpretation the collapsible section could not apply? Or did it
merely take this factor of shareholder capital-gain status into con-
sideration (second Ivey alternative) in determining whether the
requisite "view" was present?
One can certainly argue that the court took the latter posi-
tion. If so, its holding is unaffected by Ivey and Braunstein. The
Ivey decision did not turn on this point; it rested instead on statu-
tory interpretation( the first alternative). Since the Supreme Court
decision was restricted to the Ivey theory-Braunstein theory dicho-
tomy, the Supreme Court may be regarded as not having passed on
this point.
Is there an opening in the statutory wall? If so, it is a somewhat
narrow one. This much may be said, however: Even accepting the
Braunstein mechanical application of the statute, the collapsible issue
9 Braunstein v. Commissioner, 374 U.S. 65, 71 (1963).
1966]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
will still turn on whether the requisite "view" exists. So long as the
determination rests on this subjective standard, the absence of the
conversion of ordinary income into capital gain may, as in Honaker,
help persuade the court that the requisite "view" is not present.
H. "Substantial Part"
The definition of a collapsible corporation refers to a sale or ex-
change of the stock or a distribution by the corporation "before the
realization by the corporation manufacturing, constructing, pro-
ducing, or purchasing the property of a substantial part of the tax-
able income to be derived from such propetry."" The quoted phrase
raises two immediate questions (1) Does "substantial part" measure
income already realized at the time the corporation is collapsed or
does it measure income yet to be derived at that time? And (2) what
percentage of the income from the property represents a "substantial
part"?
On the first question, we find the Fifth and Tenth Circuits and
the Tax Court"' applying what would seem to be the obvious meaning
of the statute, that substantial part refers to income already realized.
The Second" and Third"' Circuits, on the other hand, take the posi-
tion that "substantial part" refers to income not yet realized.
The Third Circuit case, Abbott v. Commissioner," was an appeal
from a Tax Court decision against the taxpayer. The Third Circuit
interpreted the Tax Court opinion" as favoring the view that "sub-
stantial part" referred to income yet to be realized. The Tax Court,
in James B. Kelley,"' took the opportunity to set the record straight
and to expressly espouse the income-already-realized theory. When
the Kelley case reached the Fifth Circuit,"' the court noted the Tax
Court's apparent surprise at the Third Circuit's interpretation of the
Tax Court's Abbott opinion. The Fifth Circuit refused to follow the
Third Circuit and also refused to acknowledge that Payne v. Com-
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (b) (1) (A). (Emphasis added.)
"Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961), affirming 32 T.C. 135 (1959),
nonacq., 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 5. See also Heft v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.
1961); Levenson v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 244 (D. Ala. 1957); E. J. Zongker, 39 T.C.
1046 (1963), aff'd, 334 F.2d 44 (10th Cir. 1964); Morris v. United States, 11 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 875 (D. Kan. 1963).
"Farber v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1963).
9'Abbott v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958).
9 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958). Note that the result would probably have been the same
here regardless of the interpretation given. Compare the percentages with those in Max N.
Tobias, 40 T.C. 84 (1963).
"J. D. Abbott, 28 T.C. 795 (1957).
'0032 T.C. 135 (1959).
'0' 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961).
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missioner'°0 (a 1959 Fifth Circuit decision) supported the income-
to-be-realized theory.
In Kelley the Fifth Circuit went into an interesting discussion of
semantics. The position of the court was that there can be more than
one "substantial part" of the whole and that the indefinite article "a"
implies that there could be two or more substantial parts.
One is not surprised that the Commissioner sides with the Third
Circuit view. In Revenue Ruling 62-12 ' he announced that the In-
ternal Revenue Service will not follow either the Tax Court or the
Fifth Circuit decision in Kelley.
What percentage of the whole constitutes a "substantial part"?
Query whether the determination of "substantial" should vary with
whether one accepts the Fifth Circuit view or the Third Circuit view.
In the Abbott case'" the Third Circuit held that the corporation had
not realized a "substantial part" of the income when ninety per cent
remained unrealized. The Fifth Circuit has held that while one-
third'"' already realized is a "substantial part," one-sixth1 " is not. A
district court'' in Alabama has held that realization of fifty-one
per cent is a "substantial part." The Tax Court has held that both
thirty-four per cent and twenty-three per cent represent substantial
parts,""8 but that nine and one-half per cent ' " and seventeen per
cent 10 do not. It is interesting to note that the Fifth Circuit stated
in Kelley.' that a mechanical percentage test should not be applied.
All facts must be considered, since Congress would have provided a
mechanical application if it had wanted one.
The Honaker case,'1 discussed earlier,"' involved a corporation en-
gaged in the business of acquiring, drilling, and producing oil and gas
leases. The government claimed that only 4.8 per cent of the taxable
income from the leases had been realized at the time of the sale.""
The taxpayer claimed that about thirty-four per cent had been re-
alized. The difference lay in the expensing of intangible drilling and
development costs."'
10 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959).
103 1962-1 CUM. BULL. 321.
'4Abbott v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958).
'Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961).
'"6Heft v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1961).
107 Levenson v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 244 (D. Ala. 1957).
"'E. J. Zongker, 39 T.C. 1046 (1963), aff'd, 334 F.2d 44 (10th Cir. 1964).
'Max N. Tobias, 40 T.C. 84 (1963).
"o
0 G. A. Heft, 34 T.C. 86 (1960), aff'd, 294 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1961).
"' Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904, 913 (5th Cir. 1961).
"
2 Honaker Drilling, Inc. v. Koehler, 190 F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1960).
1I3 See text accompanying notes 80-85 supra.
114The issue was whether § 337 applied to a sale of the corporate assets so as to make
such sale nontaxable.
".'Now authorized in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 263(c).
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In the government's computations the expensing of intangibles
apparently was offset against income derived from the leases; the
government then compared the net figure against the anticipated
production from the wells. The court said that the government's
argument assumed that if the leases had not been sold, there would
have been no more drilling and development. The more reasonable
assumption, according to the court, was that the corporation would
have continued to acquire new leases, continued the drilling and de-
velopment of new and old leases, and continued to incur intangible
drilling and development costs. The court thus allowed the estimated
cost of future income as an offset to future income in arriving at the
denominator to determine the percentage of income realized.
The words "net income to be derived from such property" ' have
been said by another court.17 to mean the total amount of income
which on the date the corporation is collapsed might reasonably be
expected from the properties. The subsequent failure of such income
to materialize was regarded as irrelevant to the determination of
collapsibility. It has also been held that premiums paid by a bank to
a corporation for placing its F.H.A.-insured mortgages with that
bank are not "derived from" the collapsible property, though they
are within "net income. ' ' s
Where on the date of the initial distribution in a series of dis-
tributions the corporation had realized 17.07 per cent of the income to
be derived from the properties, but before the final distribution the
corporation had realized a cumulative profit of fifty-one per cent of
the total, the Fifth Circuit held that the corporation was collapsi-
ble.1"' The court said that collapsibility is to be determined when the
shareholders first sell or exchange the stock; the later total realization
of fifty-one per cent of the income was thus of no aid to the share-
holders.
Moreover, according to the regulations the realization must also
be substantial as to each section 341 asset (or "project") 2° and not
merely as to the corporate assets as a whole.'
116 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (b) (1) (A).
". Short v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1962), affirming 35 T.C. 922 (1961);
Bryan v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 931 (1961);
Spangler v. Commissioner, 278 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 825 (1960);
cf. Payne v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959).
"s'Sidney v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1960).
. -left. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1961).
2
'Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (4) (1955).
121 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5(d) (1955), example (2).
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IV. LIMITATIONS ON COLLAPSIBILITY-SUBSECTION (d)
Subsection (d) of section 341 provides three general limitations
to the application of the collapsible rule. These will be discussed in
the order in which they appear in the code.
A. The Five Per Cent Limitation
The collapsible section does not apply to a shareholder unless at
any time after the commencement of the manufacture, construction,
or production of the property, or at the time of (or any time after)
the purchase of section 341 assets, the shareholder either (1) owns
(or was considered as owning) more than five per cent in value of
the outstanding stock of the corporation, or (2) owns stock which is
considered as owned at such time by another shareholder who then
owns (or is considered as owning) more than five per cent in value
of the outstanding stock of the corporation.' For purposes of de-
termining stock ownership the constructive ownership rules for per-
sonal holding companies apply, except that the family attribution
rules are expanded by the collapsible section so that ownership is also
attributed from the spouse of a member of the family.'
The constructive ownership rules which appear in the personal
holding company provisions do not allow double attribution of family
and partnership ownership." For example, assume that H and W
are married. H owns no stock. H's partner, P, owns four per cent of
the stock of a company. H will be regarded as owning the stock of
that company owned by P. W, however, will not be regarded as own-
ing that stock, since to do so would result in a double attribution
among family and partners. For purposes of the five per cent limita-
tion on the ccllapsible section, however, a person does not himself have
to own the stock constructively. He is not within the exception if he
merely owns stock which is constructively owned by a more-than-
five per cent shareholder."' For instance, in the above example, P
owned four per cent of the stock of a company; H owned none.
Assume now that W also owned four per cent. As already shown, W
will not be regarded as owning P's four per cent; H, however, will be
regarded as owning P's four per cent as well as W's four per cent. H
will, therefore, be constructively a more-than-five per cent stock-
holder. Since W and P each own stock which is considered as owned
.'. INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 341 (d) (1).
"'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(d), 544(a)(1),(2),(3),(5),(6).
124 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 544(a) (5).
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (d) (1)(B).
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by a constructive more-than-five per cent shareholder (H), W and
P do not qualify for the exception to the collapsible provision."
B. The Seventy Per Cent Limitation
The gain realized by the shareholder will be immune from collapsi-
ble treatment unless more than seventy per cent of the gain is
attributable to the property manufactured, constructed, produced, or
purchased."7 Although taxpayers have often invoked this limitation,
they have done so with little success. Many of the cases dealing with
the seventy per cent limitation have involved F.H.A. overfinanced
apartment corporations, where the taxpayer attempted to attribute
his gain to something other than construction.' The courts have
rejected arguments that the gain was attributable to a favorable pur-
chase of stock subsequently redeemed,"' that it was attributable to
favorable financing.. and that it was attributable to appreciation in
the value of the land."' These are generally considered by the courts
to be attributable to construction, either planned,' underway,"' or
completed." The rationale is that "but for" the construction and
loan no gain would have been realized. As the Second Circuit stated
in Farber v. Commissioner:'
Under one interpretation, which has apparently been espoused by the
Commissioner, ... the sole test for inclusion in the seventy per cent
portion is the identity of the property to which the gain in question
"is attributable." If this is property that has been "manufactured, con-
structed, produced, or purchased" so as to meet the definition of a
collapsible corporation, then all the gain "attributable to" it qualified
for the seventy per cent on this view, irrespective of its cause, as for
example, when the gain to the stockholder represented by the fair market
value of a newly constructed office building is shown to be primarily
due to the unexpected rezoning of adjacent land and the erection of a
shopping center thereon. The taxpayer, reading the same words with a
... Lewis S. Jacobson, 32 T.C. 893 (1959), rev'd without discussion of this point, 281
F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1960); Butler v. Patterson, 148 F. Supp. 197 (D. Ala. 1957).
...INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(d) (2). Raymond S. Barry, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1129 (1963).
"'. Distributions of excess F.H.A. loan proceeds on or after June 22, 1954, fall within the
ambit of § 312(j) of the code, which in effect causes the distribution to be taxed as a
dividend to the distributee.
129E.g., Frank B. Short, 35 T.C. 922 (1961), afl'd, 302 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1962).
iSM E.g., Paul Braude, 35 T.C. 1158 (1961); Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765 (4th
Cir. 1958).
I" E.g., Payne v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959); Glickman v. Commis-
sioner, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958); Erwin Gerber, 32 T.C. 1199 (1959). See also Short
v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1962).
'Paul Braude, 35 T.C. 1158 (1961).
"'3 Jack Farber, 36 T.C. 1142 (1961), affad, 312 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1963); Mintz v.
Commissioner, 284 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1960).
"h4 Erwin Gerber, 32 T.C. 1199 (1959).
"35312 F.2d 729, 735 (2d Cir. 1963).
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different intonation, contends that gain qualifies for the 70 per cent only
if attributable to the construction itself, and that such construction
must, in addition, be performed by the collapsible corporation.
The court, in Farber, refused to attempt an allocation of the gain
between that attributable to construction in the hands of the cor-
poration in question and that attributable to subsequent construction
by the purchaser.
Two.3 of the only three13 decisions favorable to the taxpayer on
the seventy per cent limitation occurred because the Commissioner
could not sustain the burden of proof when, because of procedural
reasons, it shifted to him.
In addition, Revenue Ruling 65-184138 declares that even gain
attributable to "three-year property" (discussed next) must be count-
ed in the seventy per cent portion. The rationale is that the character
of the property as being "manufactured, constructed, produced, or
purchased" does not change merely because section 341 (d) (3) makes
section 341 (a) inapplicable to such property.
C. The Three-Year Limitation
The collapsible treatment will not be imposed on a shareholder to
the extent that gain is realized after the expiration of three years
following the completion of the manufacture, construction, produc-
tion, or purchase.13 The regulations4 ' say that this limitation applies
"to that portion" of a shareholder's gain realized more than three
years after the actual completion of the manufacture, construction,
production, or purchase of the property to which such portion is
attributable. A clarifying amendment to the regulations in 1964
adds that "if the actual completion ...occurred more than 3 years
before the date on which the gain is realized, this section shall not
apply to any part of the gain realized.... Query whether the limita-
tion could be used to exempt gain attributable to a part of a project
which has been completed.
Where a stockholder transfers property tax-free to a corporation
in exchange for stock,14 ' the revenue service has ruled1" that the period
1 6W. H. Weaver, 25 T.C. 1067 (1956); Thomas Wilson, 25 T.C. 1058 (1956). How-
ever, as a result of a subsequent case, C. D. Spangler, 32 T.C. 782 (1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d
665 (4th Cir. 1960), the Commissioner no longer has the burden of proof in such cases.137 The other is Levenson v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 244 (D. Ala. 1957).
38 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 91.
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (d) (3).
"
45 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-4(d) (1955).
141 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 95.
141 Section 351 (a) of the code provides for the non-taxability of such an exchange.143 Rev. Ru. 57-491, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 232.
1966]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
during which the stockholder held the property should be "tacked
on" in measuring the three years since manufacture, etc.
In another ruling"M the revenue service examined the effect of the
shareholder's reporting gain on the installment method (as permitted
by section 453) where an installment of the sales price is received
after the three-year period. Reasoning that section 453 does not post-
pone the date of realization of income but serves merely to postpone
taxation, the service takes the position that the installment reporting
would not affect the application of section 341. This ruling raises an
interesting question as to the application of section 341 to a cash
basis taxpayer who sells his stock within the three-year period but
who receives a contract right incapable of being valued. When does
the seller "realize" the gain-at the time of sale or upon fruition of
his receivable? The ruling would indicate the former, even though
"recognition" of gain is postponed.
The familiar question of when construction is completed appears
again in the application of the three-year limitation. It was held in
Glickman v. Commissioner'. that substantial completion is insuffici-
ent, and 98.4 per cent completion has been so treated.'" The revenue
service has ruled "7 that rezoning for construction of a shopping cen-
ter may constitute an integral step in the construction of the shopping
center. If the corporation has no other construction activity with re-
lation to the land, the three-year period begins on the day following
the date on which the rezoning became final.
In another shopping center fact situation 1 the Tax Court has held
that the construction of a retaining wall and the laying of a parking
lot were integrated and necessary aspects of construction. The court
said that these were required to be finished before the whole could be
placed in effective operation. Final completion could not be fixed
earlier than the time when the project was ready to begin earning a
"substantial part" of the "net income." However, in a later case...
dealing with an apartment house, the Tax Court failed to comment
on the fact that at the time in question work yet remained for repairs
to the walks, driveways, and steps, as well as considerable landscap-
ing, including putting in a lawn. The two cases are reconcilable under
a ready-for-use test: Whereas an apartment house can conceivably
144 Rev. Rul. 60-68, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 151.
14'256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958).
141 Mintz v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1960), affirming 32 T.C. 723 (1959).
47Rev. Rul. 56-137, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 178.
148 Edward Weil, 28 T.C. 809 (1957), aff'd, 252 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1958).
149 Maxwell Tempkin, 35 T.C. 906 (1961).
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operate without a lawn, a shopping center would have extreme dif-
ficulty operating without parking facilities.
Also consistent with this theory is a revenue ruling' ° dealing with
the construction of a multi-story office building. All of the construc-
tion described in the plans and specifications was completed by De-
cember 31, 1958. The building was totally leased and occupied by
that date. After the last tenant had secured occupancy and during
the subsequent three years, the corporation expended certain sums in
making minor alterations and corrections. The minor alterations and
corrections included a change in the decor of the interior of the
building, the removal of an obstruction for the convenience of the
tenants (but this did not increase the rentable area), and the installa-
tion of additional rest room facilities. Further alterations were made
in order to provide an office suitable for a new tenant's use and occu-
pancy. The alterations and corrections did not change the character
of the structure in any respect. There was no appreciable change in
the fair market value of the building. Emphasizing (1) the absence of
increase in rentable area, (2) the lack of change of character of the
structure, and (3) the failure to increase the fair market value of the
building and its realizable net income, the revenue service ruled that
the minor alterations and corrections were not "construction." There-
fore, since the initial construction was completed on December 31,
1958, the three-year limitation period had begun on that date.
In Revenue Ruling 64-125"1' the M corporation, immediately after
its organization in 1955, acquired an unproven and untested oil and
gas lease on a single tract of land. Late in 1955 oil was discovered on
the tract, and on November 30, 1958, M completed the sixth success-
ful well on the lease. From December, 1958, to May, 1959, three dry
holes were drilled on the tract, and all subsequent exploration failed
to add to M's known recoverable oil and gas reserves. The revenue
service declared that, for the purposes of the three-year test, M had
completed all "construction" or "production" of its property on
November 30, 1958, with the completion of the last producing well.
V. EXCEPTIONS TO COLLAPSIBILITY-
SUBSECTION (e)
The Technical Amendments Act of 1958 added subsection (e) to
section 341 and thereby provided certain exceptions to the collap-
sible rules. The expressed congressional intent in enacting subsection
'"Rev. Rul. 63-114, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 74.
". Rev. Rul. 64-125, 1964-1 CUM. BULL. 131.
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(e) may be studied in the following quotation from the report of the
Senate Committee on Finance:
The purpose of this provision [section 341], enacted originally in
1950, is to prevent income which would otherwise be taxed at ordinary
income-tax rates from being converted into income taxable at capital-
gain rates merely by use of the corporate entity. . . .The collapsible-
corporation provisions of present law, however, both by their terms and
as interpreted, are so broad that in a number of situations they have
exactly the opposite effect from that intended-instead of preventing
the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain, they may instead
convert what would otherwise be capital gain into ordinary income. The
applicability of the provisions of present law, moreover, depends upon
the subjective intent of the parties, a matter which is obviously difficult
to determine. Furthermore, if the collapsible-corporation provisions do
apply, the entire gain of the shareholder is taxed at ordinary income
rates, notwithstanding the fact that had the shareholder not employed
the corporate entity a large part of his gain might have been taxed at
capital gain rates. For these reasons, the collapsible corporation provisions
of present law frequently impede or prevent legitimate business trans-
actions and in some cases even result in the imposition of ordinary in-
come taxes which would not be imposed if the shareholders of such cor-
porations had not employed the corporate method of doing business....
Your committee believes that this amendment is desirable in order to
avoid determination of subjective intent in the .situations described in
this Amendment and also to avoid the possibility in this area of the con-
version of capital gain into ordinary income.'
The intent of the amendment was thus in part, to relieve the tax-
payer of the harsh results of collapsibility where that taxpayer would
have enjoyed capital gain without the corporate device. This is un-
questionably a problem area, as can be shown by the Ivey-Honaker
series of cases.5 ' Unfortunately, however, the relief does not go far
enough. Even though the amendment seeks "to avoid determination
of subjective intent,"'' 54 the back door remains open through the use
of a "dealer" test in determining whether the amendment applies.'55
Another fault of the subsection is that it is a statutory monster, with
sentences hundreds of words in length.
Subsection (e) creates four exceptions to the collapsible provisions.
These exceptions relate to (1) sales or exchanges of stock (other than
sales or exchanges of stock to the issuing corporation or to certain re-
lated persons) ; (2) distributions in complete liquidation taxed as
capital gains under section 331; (3) complete liquidations for which
12 S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), 1958-3 CUM. BULL. 922, 952.
153 See notes 78-94 supra, and accompanying text.
154 S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), 1958-3 CUM. BULL. 922, 953.




nonrecognition treatment is provided under section 333; and (4)
sales or exchanges of property by the corporation under section 337
(relating to nonrecognition of gain or loss to the corporation on sales
or exchanges in connection with liquidations). In order for a trans-
action to come within any of these exceptions, the net unrealized
appreciation in "subsection (e) assets" of the corporation must not
exceed fifteen per cent of the net worth of the corporation. "Net
worth" is used more in the economic sense rather than in its usual
accounting sense; the term is defined in subsection (e) to mean the
excess in fair market value of all assets over all liabilities."
A. Ordinary Income Assets
One of the definitions necessary to an understanding of subsection
(e) is that of "subsection (e) assets," which have come to be known
in the tax community as "ordinary income assets." Included are:
(1) Property (other than property used in the trade or business)
which if sold. at a gain by the corporation would result in
ordinary income. Also included is property of the corporation
which if owned and sold at a gain by a more-than-twenty per
cent' ' shareholder would result in ordinary income to that
shareholder."' It should be noted that this and the provisions
which follow impute to the corporation the dealer status of
any twenty per cent shareholder.
(2) If there is a net unrealized appreciation ° on all property used
in the trade or business, then that property used in the trade
or business which if owned and sold by a more-than-twenty
per cent shareholder would result in ordinary income to him."'
(3) Property used in the trade or business of the corporation, but
only if there is a net unrealized depreciation on all such prop-
erty.'6 ' Since the basic fifteen per cent test in subsection (e)
15 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (e) (7). If the corporation makes a distribution, in
complete liquidation, the amount of the distribution is used in determining such excess.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (e) (7) (A) (ii). Increases in net worth attributable to stock
sales or capital contributions during the preceding year will not be taken into account unless
they were for a bona fide business purpose. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (e) (7).
157 The code assumes that all property of the corporation is sold or exchanged to one per-
son in one transaction. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (e) (5) (A).
1s The percentages of ownership used throughout subsection (e) refer to the per cent
which the value of the shareholder's stock is of the total value of the outstanding stock.
159 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (e) (5) (A) (i).
I" "Net unrealized appreciation" is defined in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341 (e) (6) as
the amount by which the unrealized appreciation exceeds the unrealized depreciation. The
term "unrealized appreciation" means the amount by which the fair market value of an
asset exceeds its adjusted basis. Conversely, "unrealized depreciation" means the amount by
which the adjusted basis of the asset exceeds its fair market value.
'0' TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (e) (5) (A) (iii).
162 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (e) (5) (A) (ii).
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involves the net unrealized appreciation in subsection (e)
assets, and since property used in a trade or business is a sub-
section (e) asset (absent a twenty per cent shareholder) only
if there is net unrealized depreciation in such property, the in-
clusion of such property favors the taxpayer, by reducing the
appreciation in ordinary income assets.
(4) A copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, or
similar property, if created by the personal efforts of an indi-
vidual who owns more than five per cent of the corporation's
stock.'"
For purposes of subsection (e) the term "property used in the
trade or business" means "section 1231 (b)" property, but without
regard to the holding period therein.'" Included, for example, would
be depreciable personal property used in the trade or business and
real property used in the trade or business."' Excluded would be such
assets as inventory items"" and property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business,'67 although
these assets would still be "ordinary income assets" for subsection (e)
purposes.
For purposes of the above definition of ordinary income assets and
for purposes of transactions to which subsection (e) applies, the stock
ownership attribution rules described earlier 6 apply in determining
the amount of stock owned by a shareholder. 6 Likewise, the trade or
business of one who owns more than twenty per cent only con-
structively must be considered.'7 Note also that the dealership de-
termination "shall be made as if all property of the corporation had
been sold or exchanged to one person in one transaction..'.'.
B. "Related Person"
It will be shown later that subsection (e) does not offer relief to
certain transactions' with "related persons." The following persons
are considered to be related to a shareholder.7
(A) If the shareholder is an individual-
(i) his spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants, and
"I INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341 (e) (5) (A) (iv).
' NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341 (e) (9).
"5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 51231 (b) (1).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,5 1231 (b) (1) (A).
167 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1231 (b) (1) (B).
168 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341(d) and discussion accompanying notes 122-51
supra.
"'T INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341 (e) (10).
1'7 Treas. Reg. 5 1.341-6(b)(2)(i) (1955).
171 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341 (e) (5) (A).
11' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 55 341 (e) (1), 341 (e) (4).
13 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, S 341 (e) ((8).
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(ii) a corporation which is controlled by such shareholder.
(B) If the shareholder is a corporation-
(i) a corporation which controls, or is controlled by, the share-
holder, and
(ii) if more than 50 percent in value of the outstanding stock of
the shareholder is owned by any person, a corporation more
than 50 percent in value of the outstanding stock of which
is owned by the same person.
For purposes of determining ownership of stock in applying this
definition, the attribution rules of section 267 (c) apply, except that
the family of an individual is regarded as including only his spouse,
ancestors, and lineal descendants. "Control," for this purpose, means
stock having at least fifty per cent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least fifty per cent
of the total value of the shares of all classes of stock of the corpora-
tion. 4
C. Subsection (e) Transactions
The four transactions which subsection (e) exempts from collap-
sible treatment were mentioned earlier.' They will now be treated in
detail.
1. Sales or Exchanges of Stock The first exception relates to the
sale or exchange of the corporation's stock by a shareholder. The
corporation will not be considered collapsible if, at the time of the
sale or exchange, " the sum of the net unrealized appreciation in
certain assets does not exceed fifteen per cent of the net worth of the
corporation. This exception does not apply, however, to any sale or
exchange of stock to the issuing corporation; nor does it apply to the
sale or exchange by a more-than-twenty per cent shareholder to any
person related to him."' The figure to be used in determining the fif-
teen per cent is the sum of the following:
(1) The net unrealized appreciation in ordinary income assets;...
(2) If the selling shareholder owns more than five per cent of the
outstanding stock of the corporation, the net unrealized ap-
preciation in assets of the corporation which, if owned and
1'4 Ibid.
1 " See text accompanying note 156 supra.
176 Note that if a dealer with more than 20% ownership sells his stock first, no taint of
dealership should continue to the corporation because of him.
"" TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341 (e) (1). See text accompanying note 173 supra.
178 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (e) (I) (A).
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sold by that shareholder, would result in ordinary income to
him ;179
(3) Where the selling shareholder owns more than twenty per cent
of the outstanding stock of the corporation, and has owned
during the preceding three years more than twenty per cent
of the outstanding stock of another similar corporation,' s his
previous sales of stock of the other corporation (or sales of
assets by that corporation which were nontaxable by virtue of
section 337).. will be regarded as sales by him of a propor-
tionate part of the assets of (or assets sold by) the other cor-
poration for purposes of determining the seller's dealership
status.
If after considering these imputed sales, a dealership status is found,
(i.e., if the volume of similar sales, actual or imputed, is sufficiently
great) .. then under rules similar to (2) above, there will be added,
in applying the fifteen per cent test, the net unrealized appreciation
in assets of the corporation which, if owned and sold by that stock-
holder in his imputed dealership status, would result in ordinary in-
come to him.
2. Section 337 Liquidations Section 337 provides generally that if
a corporation adopts a plan of liquidation and within twelve months
thereafter distributes all of its assets in complete liquidation, then no
gain or loss is recognized to the corporation on the sale or exchange of
its assets during the twelve-month period. ' Section 337 does not ap-
ply, however, to a collapsible corporation as defined in section
341 (b). 1" Since this exception to section 337 depends solely on the
definition of a collapsible corporation and not on the whole of section
341, the limitations of collapsibility found in subsection (d) (i.e.,
the five per cent, seventy per cent, and three-year rules) do not help
19 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (e) (1) (B). However, property used in the corpora-
tion's trade or business will not be included unless there is a net unrealized appreciation in
such property. INT. REV. COnE OF 1954, § 341 (e) (5) (A) (iii).
... In order for the stockholder to have this imputed dealer status, at some time during
his ownership (within the preceding three years) of more than 20% of the other corpora-
tion's stock, more than 70% of the latter's assets must have been "similar or related in
service or use" to more than 70% of the assets of the corporation whose stock is being sold.
Treas. Reg. § 1.341-6(d)(1) (1955) defines the quoted phrase according to its meaning
in § 1033 (without (g) thereof).
"11 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (e) (1) (C).
12 Note that the last sentence of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (e) (5) (A) aids the
shareholder in avoiding dealership status by concerting possibly repeated sales over an
extended period of time into a single sale to a single individual.
lINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 337(a).
'"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 5 337(c)(1)(A). Sproul Realty Co., 38 T.C. 844 (1962),
acq., 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 4. See also Guy A. van Heusden, 44 T.C. 491 (1965).
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the taxpayer.8 ' The revenue service has ruled,' " however, that if gain
or loss is recognized by the corporation on the sale of all of its assets,
the realization of such income will cause the corporation to be no
longer collapsible; gain to the shareholders on liquidation may thus
be capital gain. Although the shareholder is not faced with ordinary
income on the liquidation, this is still a costly arrangement, since
both the corporation and the shareholder have incurred taxes.
Two provisions in subsection (e) are designed to relieve this prob-
lem. One... sets up standards under which an otherwise collapsible
corporation can enjoy the benefits of a section 337 liquidation. The
other.ss exempts from collapsible treatment certain distributions to
shareholders in section 337 liquidations.
For purposes of section 337, a corporation will not be considered
collapsible with respect to any sale or exchange of its properties
within the twelve-month period if all three of the following condi-
tions are met:
(1) At all times after the adoption of the plan of liquidation the
net unrealized appreciation in ordinary income assets does not
exceed fifteen per cent of the corporation's net worth;
(2) Within the twelve-month period the corporation sells sub-
stantially all of its properties; and
(3) No distribution is made of property which is depreciable,
amortizable, or depletable. In addition, any sale or exchange
of property which is depreciable, etc., by a more-than-twenty
per cent shareholder or any person related to such holder will
not be within section 337 (although the entire distribution
is not thereby destroyed)."s'
If the above requirements are met to exempt the sale of corporate
assets from taxability on gain, then, if certain further requirements
are met, the stockholders may avoid collapsible treatment on the
liquidating distributions. At all times after the adoption of the plan of
liquidation the sum of the following must not exceed fifteen per cent
of net worth:'"
185Rev. Rule 58-241, 1958-1 CUM. BULL. 179. Treas. Reg. § 1.337-1 (1955)
provides that: "section 337 does not apply to any sale or exchange of prop-
erty whenever the distribution of such property in partial or complete liqui-
dation to the shareholders in lieu of such sale or exchange would have re-
sulted in the taxation of the gain from such distribution in the manner pro-
vided in section 341 (a) as to any shareholder or would have resulted in the
taxation of the gain in such manner, but for the application of section 341 (d)."
See also Rev. Rul. 63-125, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 146.
iss Ibid.
TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (e) (4).
1S INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 341 (e) (2).
.. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, . 341(e) (4).
'go INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341 (e) (2).
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(1) The net unrealized appreciation in subsection (e) assets;
(2) If the shareholder owns more than five per cent of the stock
of the corporation, the net unrealized appreciation in assets of
the corporation which, if owned and sold by that shareholder,
would result in ordinary income to him; and
(3) If the selling shareholder owns more than twenty per cent of
the outstanding stock of the corporation and has owned dur-
ing the preceding three years more than twenty per cent of
the outstanding stock of another corporation, the imputed
"dealer" sales similar to those under the third element of de-
termination in the subsection (e) exception for sales of stock."'
3. One-Month Liquidations Section 333 of the code allows electing
shareholders to defer gain on a corporate liquidation where the dis-
tribution of all of the corporation's property occurs within one cal-
endar month. Gain will be recognized, but only to the extent of the
greater of (1) the shareholder's rateable share of earnings and profits,
or (2) money received and market value of stock or securities re-
ceived by the shareholder. Section 333, however, does not apply to a
collapsible corporation to which section 341 (a) applies."' This is a
more flexible limitation than that found in section 337 (the twelve-
month liquidation section). Section 337 is inapplicable if the corpora-
tion merely fits into the definition of a collapsible corporation."3 Sec-
tion 333, on the other hand, allows the corporation the three limita-
tions on collapsibility found in section 341 (d).9
The remaining subsection (e) exception"9 to collapsibility is de-
signed to aid shareholders who would not otherwise be entitled to the
benefits of the one-month liquidation provisions. The exception ap-
plies if at all times after the adoption of the plan of liquidation, the
net unrealized appreciation in ordinary income assets of the corpora-
tion does not exceed fifteen per cent of the corporation's net worth.
The definition of ordinary income assets is expanded for this purpose
to impute to the corporation the dealership status of a more-than-five
per cent shareholder (rather than a more-than-twenty per cent
shareholder) ."'
19 See text accompanying note 182 supra.
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 333(a).
'" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337(c)(1) (A). See also text accompanying note 191
supra.
"'See text accompanying notes 122-51 supra.
... TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (e) (3).
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VI. SHIFTING OF COLLAPSIBILITY-SUBSECTION (f)
Subsection (f)... allows a new route to relief in situations where
selling stockholders in a collapsible corporation fail to qualify"0 ' them-
selves or their corporations under either the limitations of subsection
(d) or the exceptions of subsection (e). In order for the stockholders
to enjoy the benefits of subsection (f), the corporation must consent
to recognize gain on any future disposition by the corporation of its
"subsection (f) assets. ' '202
A. The Consent And Its Effect
The selling stockholder's gain from stock of a collapsible corporation
will not be treated as ordinary income if the corporation consents to
the provisions of subsection (f) .' This rule does not apply, however,
if the sale is to the issuing corporation. 2° The consent applies to each
sale of stock of the corporation made within six months of the date of
the consent."
The corporation must consent to the recognition of gain upon cer-
tain dispositions of a "subsection (f)" asset."' In the case of a sale,
exchange, or involuntary conversion by the corporation, the excess
of the amount realized over the adjusted basis will be recognized as
gain.' In the case of any other disposition, the excess of the fair
market value of the asset over the adjusted basis will be recognized
as gain.2 The gain thus recognized by the consenting corporation is
limited to that gain which would otherwise go unrecognized because
of the various provisions in the code allowing nonrecognition of
gain."
B. Shifting The Gain
If the consenting corporation transfers its subsection (f) assets in
certain nontaxable transactions with another corporation, subsection
(f) will not increase the recognized gain. However, the transferee cor-
poration must agree to recognize gain upon the subsequent disposition
of the subsection (f) assets.2"0 This "out" for the collapsible transferor,
20 Added in 1964 by Pub. L. 88-484.
201 Or do not want to risk the failure to qualify.




200 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341 (f) (2).
207 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341 (f) (2) (A).
"8 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341 (f) (2) (B).
200 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341 (f) (2).
210 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954,5 341 (f) (3)(B).
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however, will not apply if the transferee is a tax-exempt organiza-
tion.11
The transactions in which the consenting transferor can thus shift
gain recognition to the consenting transferee are those in which the
transferor's basis carries over to the transferee by reason of sections
332 (liquidations of subsidiary), 351 (transfer to controlled cor-
poration), 361 (reorganizations), 371 (a) (receivership and bank-
ruptcy reorganizations), and 374(a) (railroad reorganizations).
C. Definition Of "'Subsection (f) Asset"
As previously noted, subsection (f) causes recognition of gain on
the disposition of a "subsection (f) asset." This term is defined to
mean any property which, as of the date of the stock sale, is a non-
capital asset and is property owned by, or subject to an option to
acquire held by, the consenting corporation."' For purposes of this
definition, land or any interest in real property (other than a secur-
ity interest) is treated as property which is not a capital asset."'
However, if within two years of the date of the stock sale, construc-
tion is commenced with respect to such land, by either the consenting
corporation or by a consenting transferee of that corporation, the
term "subsection (f) assets" includes the resulting improvements."4
Unrealized receivables or fees from the sale of noncapital assets or
from services are also treated as property which is not a capital asset."'
If manufacture, construction, or production with respect to a "sub-
section (f) asset" has commenced before the stock sale, the term
"subsection (f) asset" does include the property resulting from the
manufacture, construction, or production."'
D. Five-Year Limitation As To Shareholders
A shareholder can utilize subsection (f) immunity only once in
every five years." ' A similar sale by a "related person""' within the
five-year period will also disqualify the taxpayer from subsection (f)
immunity." This five-year rule has no exceptions, nor is there a pro-
vision for waiver of the rule by the Commissioner."' However, the
"'T INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341 (f) (3) (A).
212NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(f) (4) (A).
23 Ibid.
"14 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (f) (4) (C).
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,55 341 (f)(4)(A), 341 (b)(4).
"e INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (f) (4) (B).
27 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341 (f) (5).
"8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, as defined in § 341 (e) (8) (A). See discussion accompanying
note 173 supra.
219 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, S 341 (f) (5).
21 Compare, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341 (f) (5).
1966]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
provisions of subsection (f) do not apply to a sale of stock by the
shareholder if, during the preceding five-year period, the shareholder
has enjoyed the protection of selling stock in another consenting cor-
poration."'1
E. Corporate Chains
If a corporation (corporation A) owns five per cent or more22 of
the outstanding stock of another corporation (corporation B) and a
sale of A stock is made during a six-months consent period by A, the
consent by A will not be valid with respect to that sale unless B has
(within six months) filed a consent with respect to its stock.2" This
consent will apply to assets owned by B at a time at which an A or B
shareholder sells stock within six months. The same rules will apply to
a whole chain of corporations connected by the five per cent owner-
ship requirement.
F. The Use Of Subsection (f)
A corporation which, to benefit its shareholders, consents to sub-
section (f) pledges itself to recognize gain on the disposition of the
properties. However, it does not pledge itself to dispose of the prop-
erties; nor does it pledge itself to recognize ordinary income on the
disposition. One must be wary, however, when counseling a consent-
ing corporation. For example, the trade-in of used equipment for
new equipment, normally a nontaxable exchange under section
1031 (a), may result in recognition of gain. All or part of this gain
may be ordinary income if the depreciation recapture rules of sec-
tion 1245 apply. This is a typical situation in which a tax counsel
may learn of the transaction after it has occurred and when it is too
late to coordinate the timing of the gain into the planned tax picture
for the year.
The subsection (f) election also creates another factor which must
be added to the checklist of items to be inquired about and drafted
against in the acquisition of substantial blocks of corporate stock.
Otherwise, the unsuspecting purchaser may fall victim to unplanned
tax consequences on the disposition of the "subsection (f) assets."
For example, corporation C may purchase all of the stock of electing
corporation D, planning to liquidate D into C within two years and
thus enjoy the stepped-up basis afforded by section 334(b) (2). C,
the acquiring corporation, may well enjoy this benefit if it knows
221 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (f) (5).
222 In value.
2
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, S 341 (f)(6).
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that D has elected under subsection (f), and, if C, in turn, agrees to
recognition of gain on the disposition of any "subsection (f) assets"
received in the liquidation. If C, not knowing of D's election, fails to
agree to such recognition of gain, C will still gets its stepped-up basis,
but at the cost of gain recognized by D at the time of the liquidation.
The Treasury has not yet published proposed regulations on sub-
section (f). The mechanics of the consent by the corporation have,
therefore, not yet been prescribed. This poses problems not only to
the seller of collapsible stock but also to the purchaser, who must re-
ly on the word of the seller and perhaps inadequate corporate rec-
ords to tell him whether the seller's assets are tainted. It is submitted
that the regulations should set forth a simple method for such con-
senting. A procedure should also be established whereby a prospective
purchaser of stock can inquire as to a possible previous consent by the
selling corporation. To protect the selling corporation from needless
and harmful disclosure, the agreement of the selling corporation to
such inquiry could be required.
All is not lost even if subsequent to a purchase the purchaser finds
himself controlling an electing corporation. The "subsection (f)
assets" may be retained and exploited to produce desirable income.
This appears to be in line with the congressional intent in enacting
subchapter (f).2 If the property disposed of is property used in the
acquiring corporation's trade or business, the disposition may result
in capital gains. And the consenting corporation may still have avail-
able to it the "out" of a nontaxable transfer in a reorganization22 or
possibly a Subchapter "S" election. 2'
VI. SOME OTHER WAYS OUT OF THE COLLAPSIBLE TRAP
Two of the most frequently discussed remedies for a collapsible
corporation are the Subchapter "S" election and nontaxable exchanges
in reorganizations. These and other planning tools are discussed be-
low.
A. Subchapter "S"
Subchapter "S" of the code, which was enacted in 1958, allows
stockholders in certain corporations having ten or fewer stockholders
to elect a quasi-partnership type taxation."7 The most attractive fea-
ture of a Subchapter "S" election, for purposes of planning around
section 341, is the taxing of what would otherwise be capital gains of
224 See S. REP. No. 1241, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 684.
2. Assuming the transferee consents. See discussion accompanying note 210 supra.




the corporation as capital gains of the shareholders." 8 Since the benefits
of section 337 liquidations are generally not available to a collapsible
corporation, it cannot sell its capital assets and distribute the proceeds
without double taxation. Neither can the shareholders sell their stock
or receive distributions in cash or kind without ordinary income con-
sequences. Subchapter "S" has generally been regarded as a means of
obtaining both capital gains (at least in part) and single taxation in
such a situation. Even if the shareholder is a dealer in the property,
capital gains should result to him because the characterization of
"capital" or "ordinary" is made at the corporate level.
Prior to 1966, if the corporation were ineligible for the Subchap-
ter "S" election because, for example, too much of its income had
come from passive type investments,"9 the sale of assets could be
planned for the beginning of a new taxable year. The resulting gain,
being the bulk of the income recognized for such year, could make
the corporation eligible for the election.
In 1966 Congress sought to close this loophole by enacting a new
section in Subchapter "S." Section 1378 provides, in effect, that a tax
will be due on the income of such corporation if (1) the excess of a
corporation's net long-term capital gain over short term capital loss
exceeds $25,000, (2) such excess is more than fifty per cent of a cor-
poration's taxable income for the year, and (3) the corporation's
taxable income for that year exceeds $2 5,000.20 The gain will not be
taxed to the corporation, however, if it has elected Subchapter "S"
for the preceeding three taxable years.2" If the corporation has been
in existence for less than four taxable years, the gain will not be
taxed if the corporation has elected Subchapter "S" for each year of
its existence." * However, even though one of these two exceptions
would apply, the gain may still be taxed to the extent that it is at-
tributable to property acquired during the current year or the pre-
ceding three years in a nontaxable transaction with another corpora-
tion in which the electing corporation took the other corporation's
basis in the properties. The gain on those properties will be taxed
unless the transferor corporation was under a Subchapter "S" election
for that period preceding the transfer.' This amendment does not
eliminate completely the usefulness of Subchapter "S" but it cer-
tainly makes it more difficult to use.
228 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1375(a).
29 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e)(5).
230 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1378 (a).
211 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1378(c)(1).
212 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1378(c)(2).
23 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1378(c)(3).
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Even those who can still fit their collapsible corporation into Sub-
chapter "S" must cope with Regulation Section 1.13 7 5-1 (d) :
Ordinarily, for purposes of determining whether gain on the sale or
exchange of an asset by an electing small business corporation is capital
gain, the character of the asset is determined at the corporate level.
However, if an electing small business corporation is availed of by any
shareholder or group of shareholders owning a substantial portion of the
stock of such corporation for the purpose of selling property which in
the hands of such shareholder or shareholders would not have been an
asset, gain from the sale of which would be capital gain, then the gain
on the sale of such property by the corporation shall not be treated as
a capital gain. For this purpose, in determining the character of the
asset in the hands of the shareholder, the activities of other electing
small business corporations in which he is a shareholder shall be taken
into consideration.
There is not express statutory authority for the Commissioner's posi-
tion in the above regulation, and, in the writers' opinion, the regula-
tion is invalid. Those who would use the Subchapter "S" device can
cite the Supreme Court's Braunstein decision as supporting a strict
reading of the statutory language. Moreover, the fact that Congress
found it necessary to tighten up Subchapter "S" is a strong indica-
tion that the original Subchapter "S" failed to take the collapsible
provisions into account.
One of the interesting questions raised by subsection (f) is
whether, once a consent is made by a corporation, the Subchapter "S"
"out" from collapsibility is still available.' Subsection (f) demands
that "such gain shall be recognized notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of this subtitle, but only to the extent that such gain is not
recognized under any other provision of this subtitle."' Gain or loss,
for income tax purposes, is generally "recognized" unless there is
some express statutory authority providing for its nonrecognition."'
If it is so recognized, it becomes a part of "gross income, 23 and to the
extent "gross income" exceeds allowable deductions, it constitutes
"taxable income." ' Section 11 of the code imposes the corporate tax
on such "taxable income. ' ' "s If a Subchapter "S" election is made,
however, the corporation is not subject "to the taxes imposed by this
chapter."" ° Thus, even though the "recognized" gain goes into the
234 Assuming, of course, that § 1378 does not cause the gain to be recognized at the
corporate level.
235 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (f)(2).
236 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1002.
237 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a).2 8 TNT. REV. COoE OF 1954, 5 63 (a).
239 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1I(a).
240INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(b)(i).
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computation of taxable income, since Subchapter "S" causes the
corporate tax not to be imposed on such income, the taxable effect
of the subsection (f) consent may still be avoidable.
B. Reorganizations
The "reorganization" provisions of the code.' furnish means for
combining or modifying the ownership interests in corporations with-
out recognition of gain or loss. In order to take advantage of these
provisions a corporation must comply with the strict statutory lan-
guage of the code, as well as certain tests which have been established
by judicial and administrative decisions. The nonstatutory tests have
been given the descriptive labels of "business purpose, "continuity of
business enterprise," and "continuity of interest."
Nothing in the language of the statute appears to preclude a col-
lapsible corporation's enjoying the tax-free participation in a reor-
ganization. Indeed, to deny a collapsible corporation access to the
tax-free reorganization provisions would violate the spirit of those
sections. Because of the very nature of a collapsible corporation, it is
destined to be abandoned by its initial stockholders. If these same
stockholders determine that they would rather hold a continuing
interest in another corporation which is willing to absorb the business
of the collapsible corporation, the requisite business purpose is not
difficult to find. Examples might be the stronger financial structure
of the combined organization, the competence of the acquiring cor-
poration's management, and the greater diversity of risk. In the usual
situation there is little doubt that the acquiring corporation is moti-
vated by a bona fide business purpose. Likewise, the requirement of
continuity of the business is generally met.
On the other hand, the continuity of interest requirement pre-
sents a more formidable obstacle, for the shareholders of the collap-
sible corporation may enter into the reorganization with a pre-
arranged agreement to dispose of the stock they receive. It is fairly
certain that if by prearrangement stock in the continuing corpora-
tion representing more than majority ownership in the collapsible
entity is to be sold after the reorganization, there is inadequate con-
tinuity of interest.4 ' However, if (1) the sales are on the open mar-
ket and not prearranged,' (2) only a minority of collapsible cor-
241 See generally INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 5§ 361, 368 (a). Note that the tax-free liqui-
dation sections are generally not available to the collapsible corporation though. See notes
184-86 supra and accompanying text.
' LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1966)
and cases collected at 3 MERTENS, TAXATION § 20.59 (rev. ed. 1965).
24'Rena v. Farr, 24 T.C. 350 (1955), acq., 1955-2 Cu.M. BULL. 6.
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poration shareholders arranged in advance to sell, or (3) a majority
shareholder arranged in advance to sell only a minority interest, then
a continuity of interest probably does exist.
If the combined corporation after a reorganization is not collap-
sible and there is sufficient continuity and purpose, disposition of the
stock should be immune from section 341; that section treats as or-
dinary income gain on a sale, exchange, etc., of stock only when a
"collapsible corporation" is involved.'"
If the corporation resulting from the reorganization is collapsible,
then the selling stockholder must rely on the limitations," the excep-
tions,246 or the consent, all discussed earlier. The application of these
rules is extremely difficult. Consider, for example, the most promising
of the available escape routes after a reorganization, the five per cent
limitation. It does not apply if at any time after the commencement
of the manufacture, construction, or production of property, the
shareholder owned more than five per cent of the stock in the cor-
poration. The statute applies this test to the stock of the collapsible
corporation which is sold, not to the collapsible corporation which
was absorbed. For this reason, the writers believe that the Commis-
sioner would be unsuccessful in an attempt to look back to the per-
centage before the reorganization, particularly if the collapsible cor-
poration is not the survivor in the reorganization. However, this is
not to say that he will not try.
The seventy per cent limitation also may cause problems in appli-
cation. The reorganized corporation may have sufficient other assets
so that more than seventy per cent of the gain on the sale of stock
will be attributable to noncollapsible property, but this may not be
sufficient. The regulations 4 state that the gain attributable to such
property is the excess of the recognized gain over the gain which the
shareholder would have had if the property had not been manufac-
tured, constructed, etc. As a matter of economics, the stockholder
may be recognizing gain that was earned in the collapsible efforts of
his original corporation. Thus, if the seventy per cent test was inap-
plicable to his original corporation, it may be inapplicable, as far as
he is concerned, to the organized corporation.
The three-year limitation would probably not be affected by a
reorganization.
A reorganization could have a two-fold beneficial effect in apply-
2' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (a).2 4 5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 341 (d).
246 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (e).
247 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341 (f).
24' Treas. Reg. § 1.341-4(c) (2) (1966).
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ing the exceptions of subsection (e). First, since the ownership of
the combined corporation is presumably spread over a larger number
of people, the five per cent-twenty per cent shareholder-dealer status
may be easier to avoid. And similarly, since the corporations combine
both their assets and net worth, the fifteen per cent-of-net-worth
test may be easier to meet.
C. The Seventy Per Cent Limitation
This limitation .4 can be a valuable planning device. The object is,
of course, to pad the thirty per cent, noncollapsible assets side of the
computation.
One method for accomplishing this result is by merely transferring
appreciated securities (or other non-"section 341 assets") to the
corporation in a section 351 exchange or contribution to capital,
preferably at the time of incorporation. One major problem with this
device is that dividends and interest raise the possibility of personal
holding company tax in early years. This could be combatted with
substantial non-investment income, or expenses which use up the
passive income. A recent amendment to the code has opened up Sub-
chapter "S" as a means of combatting the personal holding company
tax in early years.
Until recently a corporation could not elect Subchapter "S" if its
passive type income (e.g., dividends, rent, and interest) was more
than twenty per cent of its gross receipts. In 1966 the statute was
amended to permit a Subchapter "S" election for the first and second
taxable years in which a corporation conducts an active business,
even though passive income exceeds twenty per cent. However, the
passive income for each such year must be less than $3,000.m
Another method of fitting into the seventy per cent limitation in-
volves the accumulation of income by the corporation. The Commis-
sioner takes the position that in making the seventy per cent compu-
tation, accumulated income from "Section 341 assets" must be in-
cluded because it is "attributable to" those assets (even though the
corporate tax has already been paid on it)."' Therefore, accumulated
income from noncollapsible assets should be attributable to those
assets and includable on the thirty per cent side. Distributing collap-
sible income would thus be advantageous.
249 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (d) (2).
2"0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e) (5), as amended by P. L. 89-389, § 3(a) (1966).
2
5 1 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-4(c) (4) (1966); accord, Spangler v. Commissioner, 278 F.2d
665 (4th Cir. 1960).
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D. Single vs. Multiple Corporations
The choice between a single or multiple corporate framework
should be made after careful consideration. As shown in the previous
section, the inclusion of substantial noncollapsible property in the
corporation may make compliance with the seventy per cent limita-
tion requirements possible. For this reason it is often advisable to
operate with a single corporation.
If the seventy per cent test cannot be met, multiple corporations
might be preferable, so as to isolate noncollapsible properties and
otherwise valid capital gains from the collapsible taint. Another ad-
vantage of using multiple corporations is that it allows piecemeal
selling of interests in individual properties immediately upon expira-
tion of the three-year limitation period. 5 ' Of course, the ever-present
problems involved in any multiple corporation operation, raised by
sections such as 269, 482, 1551, and 1561, must be contended with.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The collapsible provisions of the code extend to uncharted boun-
daries. Even within their known limits, the provisions generate a frus-
trating bundle of unanswered questions. Through a careful study of
the code, the regulations, the legislative history, and the administra-
tive and judicial interpretations, one can usually chart a course that
is relatively safe. But only extensive litigation or an amendment of the
statute will produce clarity in the many vague areas of the collapsible
corporations section of the code.
'
5 2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (d) (3).
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